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Abstract: 
This paper examines the influence of political risk guarantees of bilateral investment 
treaties on debt and equity flows using panel data on middle income countries for the 
period 1984-2011. Adopting system GMM methodology, the paper empirically finds 
that ratified bilateral investment treaties with OECD countries have a combined 
positive influence on non-guaranteed debt flows and a direct positive influence on 
portfolio equity flows. The results highlight the importance of considering political 
risk guarantees in financial integration, regulation of financial markets and 
institutions, and capital liberalization.  
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Political Risk Guarantees and Capital Flows: 
The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The recent global financial crisis, which started with the US subprime crisis in 
February 2007 and spread to many European countries - Iceland, Belgium, Latvia, 
Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal, and Spain - over the past five years, has created 
a squeeze in the supply of capital to middle income countries. The squeeze in the first 
two years of the crisis (2007-2009) was more apparent in debt compared to FDI 
flows. Debt flows to middle income countries declined by more than 70 percent from 
about $450 billion in 2007 compared to $130 billion in 2009 (Figure 1).
2
 In contrast, 
the decline in equity flows was much less: FDI flows decreased by 24 percent from 
$543 billion in 2007 to $410 billion in 2009, while portfolio equity flows decreased 
by 14 percent from $133 billion to $114 billion. 
[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
While these figures may lend support to the view that FDI in particular and 
equity in general are more stable than the other types of capital flows in financial 
crises (Agenor 2003; Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann 2001; Stiglitz 2000), they raise 
interest about the role of political risk guarantees, namely of bilateral investment 
treaties, in attracting capital flows, whether equity or debt. The use of bilateral 
investment treaties has proliferated over the last three decades. The total number of 
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 These countries are Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Democratic Republic), Costa 
Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, South 
Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
Yemen, and Zambia. These 68 sample countries are classified as middle income based on the World 
Bank’s 2012 classification on which ICRG’s political risk data and UNCTAD’s bilateral investment 
treaties data are available.   
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newly ratified bilateral investment treaties by middle income countries multiplied 
more than 55 times, from 33 in 1985 to 1854 in 2012. 
Building on Fitzpatrick (1983) political risk is due to unwanted consequences of 
government or sovereign actions on business. These actions may take the forms of 
industry- and/or firm-level constraints, such as expropriation, restrictions on 
remittance of profits, and discriminatory taxation. Political risk can also be due to 
hard-to-anticipate discontinuities in the business environment, which have the 
potential to significantly affect the profit or other goals of a particular enterprise. 
Accordingly in this paper the definition of political risk incorporates not only 
government actions but also policy uncertainty, whether or not associated with 
political instability, which encroach on domestic and foreign businesses.  
Bilateral investment treaties reduce political risk to foreign investors. They 
establish clear, simple, and enforceable rules for foreign investment protection from 
expropriation, specify the circumstances under which expropriation takes place and 
the compensation standards, and design the necessary investment dispute settlement 
mechanisms between states and investors (Ginsburg 2005; Hallward-Driemeier 2003; 
Mina 2009; Neumayer and Spess 2005; UNCTAD 1998).
3,4
 Bilateral investment 
treaties therefore reduce policy uncertainty and guarantee the presence and adoption 
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 For example, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 of the 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
state that, “1. Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or 
indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization (“expropriation”), except: (a) 
for a public purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory manner; (c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation; and (d) in accordance with due process of law and Article 5 [Minimum 
Standard of Treatment] (1) through (3). 2. The compensation referred to in paragraph 1(c) shall: (a) be 
paid without delay; (b) be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment 
immediately before the expropriation took place (“the date of expropriation”); (c) not reflect any 
change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier; and 
(d) be fully realizable and freely transferable.” The 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaties 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf. 
4
 See for example sections B and C of the 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty.  
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of rules for foreign investment protection, which may boost foreign investor's 
confidence and promote foreign investment flows.
5 
The domain of foreign investment bilateral investment treaties cover extends 
beyond FDI. FDI has been the only type of capital flows examined in the bilateral 
investment treaties literature. Foreign investment, in the 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaties for example, is defined as “every asset that an investor owns or 
controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including 
such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation 
of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk”. An investment may take the form of an 
enterprise; shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise; 
bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans; and futures, options, and other 
derivatives
. 6,7
 Therefore, bilateral investment treaties provide political risk guarantees 
to portfolio equity, private non-guaranteed debt in addition to FDI. They may even 
provide guarantees to public and publicly guaranteed debt as far as multinational 
corporations seek guarantees on their loans from host country governments.
8
  
In this paper we empirically examine the influence of bilateral investment 
treaties’ political risk guarantees on capital flows using panel data on middle income 
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 Recent empirical studies in the FDI literature show positive impact of bilateral investment treaties on 
FDI flows (Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004; Egger and Merlo 2007; Neumayer and Spess 2005; Tobin and 
Rose-Ackerman 2006).  
6
 The definition of assets also includes “turnkey, construction, management, production, concession, 
revenue-sharing, and other similar contracts; intellectual property rights; licenses, authorizations, 
permits, and similar rights conferred pursuant to domestic law; and other tangible or intangible, 
movable or immovable property, and related property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens, and 
pledges”. 
7
 UNCTAD (2007) identifies four definitions of investment: “asset-based” definition; a “tautological” 
definition; a “closed-list” definition; and a limiting definition which excludes certain assets and 
transactions. Most recent bilateral investment treaties have adopted the first definition, which covers 
every or any kind of assets and typically includes: a) movable and immovable property and any related 
property rights; b) interests in companies, such as shares, stock, bonds, and debentures; c) claims to 
money and claims under a contract having a financial value and loans directly related to a specific 
investment; d) intellectual property rights; and e) business concessions. 
8
 In discussing determinants of capital flows, Hooper and Kim (2007) point out that opacity in 
corruption might increase the likelihood of multinational corporations seeking loan guarantees resulting 
in an increase in capitals inflows.  
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countries for the period 1984-2011 adopting system GMM estimation methodology. 
The paper empirically finds that ratified bilateral investment treaties with OECD 
countries have a total positive influence on non-guaranteed debt flows and portfolio 
equity flows.  
The paper contributes to the literature in two main respects. First, it examines 
the influence of bilateral investment treaties beyond FDI to different types of capital 
flows constituting foreign investment. This has not been examined in the literature 
before to the best of our knowledge despite the wide definition of foreign investment 
covered in bilateral investment treaties. In addition, the paper distinguishes between 
non-guaranteed and guaranteed debt flows, helping to provide an understanding of 
long-term creditors’ responses to political risk guarantees, an issue that has not been 
explored before. 
Second, by accounting for government efforts to reduce political risk through 
contracting bilateral investment treaties, this paper provides a more realistic and 
policy-oriented political risk definition than elsewhere in the literature. While political 
risk has been defined to reflect government actions that can adversely affect 
businesses, this definition does not take into account government reforms to 
ameliorate political risk through bilateral investment treaties.
9
 We account in the 
theoretical and empirical models for political risk, political risk guarantees, and the 
interaction between them. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief survey of the 
determinants of capital flows and the impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI, 
and highlights literature messages and gaps. Section 3 specifies the empirical model 
and data. Section 4 discusses the empirical issues and estimation methodology. 
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 Signing or ratifying bilateral investment treaties in reality may stem from pressure by domestic and/or 
foreign investors. 
6 
 
Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes, highlights 
the policy implications, and identifies issues for future research. 
 
2. Literature survey 
 In this section we first explore the determinants of capital flows in the 
voluminous capital flows literature and then turn to explore the impact of bilateral 
investment treaties on FDI. The purpose of this section is to identify the messages and 
gaps in the literature on which this research builds.
10
 
 
2.1 Determinants of capital flows 
The development of capital flows determinants literature largely reflects the 
increasing financial globalization that has taken place over the past three decades and 
the roles that external and domestic economic fundamentals play in encouraging or 
discouraging capital flows. Among the domestic factors, political risk has attracted 
special attention in the capital flows literature owing to their contribution in triggering 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In addition to those examined factors, a major strand 
of the capital flows determinants literature explored the role that capital liberalization 
or controls play in promoting or limiting capital flows. This logic underlies the brief 
literature survey discussion below. 
 The determinants of capital flows have been extensively examined in the capital 
flows literature. Some studies have distinguished between the role of external (push) 
and domestic (pull) factors (Calvo et al 1996; Fernandez-Arias 1996). Calvo et al 
(1996) explain capital flows during the 1990s in terms of external factors to the 
recipient economy and domestic factors. External factors to the recipient economy 
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 A comprehensive review of the literature is beyond the scope of this research.  
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include declining world interest rates, which improve creditworthiness and reduce 
default risk in developing countries, global business cycle, integration of world capital 
markets, diversification of investments internationally, and contagion effects. 
Domestic factors include sound domestic monetary and fiscal policies, and trade and 
capital market liberalization. Similar to Calvo et al (1996), Fernandez-Arias (1996) 
argued that the decline in world interest rates improved creditworthiness and reduced 
default risk in developing countries, and therefore perceived capital flows as a result 
of the interaction between external push factors and domestic pull factors.  
 Over the past three decades of increased global financial integration many 
governments adopted policies of financial liberalization in order to lure more capital 
flows and reap the benefits of smoothing consumption, boosting investment, and 
speeding up economic growth, while other governments adopted capital control 
measures to reduce the disruption that the high volumes and volatility of capital 
inflows and outflows create. A number of studies have focused on the impact of 
financial liberalization and capital controls (Binici et al 2010; Campion and Neumann 
2004; Okada 2013). Binici et al (2010) examine the efficacy of capital controls in 74 
countries during the period 1995-2005 in stemming inflows and outflows of equity, 
FDI, and debt holdings.  They find that the efficacy of capital controls is on the 
outflow side but is very little or absent on the inflow side. In addition they find that 
the efficacy of capital controls is low in in low and middle income countries. Okada 
(2013) attributes the efficacy of capital controls to institutional quality, and examines 
the effect of these two factors and their interaction on FDI and foreign private 
investment. He finds that while there is no individual impact of financial openness 
and institutional quality on capital inflows, the interaction between these two factors 
has a significant impact. Unlike the above studies which examined the impact of 
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capital controls on volume of capital inflows, Campion and Neumann (2004) using 
high frequency data examine the effect on the composition of international capital 
flows in Latin American countries in 1990-2000. They find that capital controls alter 
the composition of capital inflows in such a way that discourages short-term capital 
and reduces the volatility of capital inflows. This however comes at the expense of 
reducing capital inflows. 
 Recent studies have focused on the role of institutions and political risk as 
domestic factors in attracting capital flows (Daude and Fratzscher 2008; De Santis 
and Luhrmann 2009; Fratzscher 2012; Hooper and Kim 2007; Kim and Wu 2008; 
Papaioannou 2009).
11
 Fratzscher (2012) explores the drivers of global portfolio 
investment flows using high frequency mutual funds data for the period 2005-2010 
differentiating between financial crises and the subsequent recovery, and between 
common global shocks and country-specific factors.
12
 He finds that during crises there 
is a strong divergence in capital flows across countries with dynamics of capital flows 
primarily driven by safe-haven flows. He also finds that the effect of global shocks, in 
particular during the recovery period, was heterogeneous and depended on the 
recipient country’s institutional quality, country risk, and the strength of 
macroeconomic fundamentals and policies. He contends that, “countries are far from 
innocent bystanders that are powerless in being exposed to volatile global markets, 
and that indeed they have tools to insulate to some extent their economies from 
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 Other studies, which examine the influence of property rights protection on foreign direct investment 
and portfolio investment, include Alfaro et al (2008), Asiedu (2006), Busse and Hefeker (2007), Daude 
and Stein (2007), Du et al  (2008), Faria and Mauro (2009), Mishra and Daly (2007), Naude and 
Krugell (2007), and Wei (2000). Studies examining the influence on international lending include 
Kraay and Nehru (2004), Lane (2004), Mina (2006; 2011), and Mina and Martinez-Vazquez (2006). 
The empirical evidence of these studies suggests that better domestic institutional functions encourage 
capital inflows and tilt the capital structure of countries towards equity and away from debt. 
12
 He focuses on common global liquidity, risk, and macroeconomic news shocks. 
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adverse global shocks” (p 2). Earlier Daude and Fratzscher (2008) finds that 
institutional quality matters most for portfolio investment and least for FDI. 
 Opacity of the operating environment seems to matter for capital flows. Hooper 
and Kim (2007) examine the role of operating environment opacity in influencing 
FDI, portfolio investment, and international bank lending.
13
 They argue that opacity in 
general discourages capital flows. However, with the profit opportunities it creates, 
opacity may increase capital flows. For example, multinational corporations (MNCs) 
may concentrate on FDI to exploit accounting and reporting opacity in order to 
maximize profit. Other forms of capital flows may respond differently to accounting 
opacity. 
 Interestingly they point out that opacity in corruption might increase FDI or 
international bank lending.  Corruption opacity can increase MNCs likelihood of 
obtaining loans, which are government guaranteed, or favorable tax treatments, thus 
increasing FDI flows to the country. Corruption opacity might take the form of 
government guarantees of crony capitalists’ international loans, increasing the 
likelihood of obtaining loans and thus international bank lending. In contrast, legal 
opacity reduces contract enforcement and protection of property rights and thus 
capital flows in general. 
 In explaining the Lucas (1990) paradox on why capital flows from poor to rich 
countries, contrary to the neoclassical model prediction of capital flowing in the 
opposite direction, Papaioannou (2009) focuses on the role of institutions in 
explaining these flows and finds that weak institutions – weak property rights 
protection, inefficient legal system and high risk of investment expropriation – deter 
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 They use Price Waterhouse Coopers’ opacity index covering corruption, legal, economic, 
accounting/reporting, and regulation opacity as well as aggregate opacity. 
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banking flows. Similarly, in examining mainly the role of demographic structure in 
international portfolio flows, De Santis and Luhrmann (2009) find that lower quality 
institutions deter net portfolio inflows explaining the capital reallocation from 
developing to developed countries. 
 Going beyond specific institutional influence, Kim and Wu (2008) empirically 
examine the impact of country risk measured by sovereign credit ratings on capital 
flows. They find that foreign currency long-term ratings proved to be the most 
important stimulus for international (as opposed to domestic) capital flows, while 
local currency long-term ratings had negative impact on international capital flows. 
Short-term foreign and domestic currency ratings have detrimental effect on 
international capital flows. 
 
2.2 Bilateral investment treaties and FDI  
The influence of bilateral investment treaties on FDI has been examined in the 
FDI literature. Earlier studies found little positive impact of these treaties, while the 
more recent ones found a significantly positive impact. UNCTAD (1998) examines 
the impact of investment treaties on FDI using both time series and cross-section 
analyses with results of time-series analysis more suggestive of the positive impact of 
investment treaties on FDI. Similarly to UNCTAD’s cross section analysis results, 
Hallward-Driemeier (2003) finds little positive impact of investment treaties, possibly 
masked by lower trade barriers between country pairs, increased knowledge of 
conducting business in the host country, or tax treaty ratification. She also finds that 
treaties are complementary to strong domestic institutions. Treaties become more 
effective when institutions are reformed or of high quality and are not short-cut for 
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institutional reforms, a conclusion Mina (2012) confirms in the case of MENA 
countries. 
More recent studies found a significant positive impact of bilateral investment 
treaties (Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004; Neumayer and Spess 2005; Tobin and Rose-
Ackerman 2006). Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) distinguish between ratified and 
signed treaties, and find a higher positive impact of ratified treaties reflecting the 
higher degree of commitment. Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2006) find positive impact 
of treaties on FDI in subsequent periods though the marginal impact diminishes with 
the increase in the number of treaties. Similar to Hallward-Driemeier (2003), Tobin 
and Rose-Ackerman (2006) find that a stronger political environment complements 
investment treaties. 
 
2.3 Messages and gaps  
 In summary the brief literature survey of the capital flows determinants 
highlights that institutional quality or more generally political risk, and the strength of 
macroeconomic fundamentals and policies matter for attracting capital flows as well 
as for insulation and recovery from global shocks. More specifically, a high risk of 
investment expropriation deters both bank loans and portfolio flows. In addition, the 
FDI literature shows positive impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI. 
 There are no studies, to the best of our knowledge, which examine the impact of 
bilateral investment treaties on foreign investment other than FDI. As mentioned in 
the introduction, foreign investment may take the form of an enterprise; shares, stock, 
and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise; bonds, debentures, other debt 
instruments, and loans; and futures, options, and other derivatives. A positive 
influence of bilateral investment treaties on debt and equity flows may be viewed as 
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an additional means to promote capital flows. In particular, a positive influence on 
long-term as opposed to short-term debt may be viewed as an insulation of countries 
from global financial shocks. 
 
3. Empirical model and data 
 The empirical model specification builds on Wei and Wu (2001), who examine 
the effect of distortionary corruption on FDI by a multinational firm using a simple 
optimization model. The multinational firm chooses the level of FDI, which 
maximizes its after-tax and after-bribery profit. In this paper, we also formulate an 
optimization model. However, instead of examining the effect of distortionary 
corruption on FDI, we examine the effect of political risk, political risk guarantees, 
and the interaction between both of them on foreign investment. 
Foreign investors obtain capital in world capital markets. A foreign investor 
chooses the level of foreign investment, whether equity or credit, she extends to a host 
country j that maximizes her profit π. The optimization problem can be expressed as: 
   ∑ [ (  )   (               )  ]
 
     (1) 
where   is foreign investor’s profit,    is the flow of foreign investment the foreign 
investor extends to the host country,   is the cost of foreign investment, which is a 
function of the risk-free world interest rate   and a political risk premium  , and 
j=1,…,N. The political risk premium for country j is function of the rate of 
government expropriation    of a dollar of foreign investment  and the rate of political 
risk guarantee    of investment, which bilateral investment treaties provide, and the 
interaction between the two,      .  
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We model political risk premium using two approaches. The first approach 
considers the premium to be driven primarily by the risk of investment expropriation. 
Political risk guarantees interact with expropriation risk and mitigates it.  Accordingly 
the political risk premium can be expressed in specific form as: 
     (    )  (2) 
The second approach considers the premium to be driven primarily by 
political risk guarantees. Expropriation risk interacts with the guarantees: If the risk of 
investment expropriation is high, it may reduce the level of guarantee bilateral 
investment treaties provide.  Accordingly the political risk premium can be expressed 
in specific form as: 
     (    )  (2') 
 The effects of   and   on the political risk premium are intuitively expected to 
positive and negative (          )  respectively, which in turn have negative 
and positive effects on profits (           .  
Accordingly, the corresponding empirical models we estimate are given by: 
Ki,t= β0 + β1 Ki,t-l + β2 Ri,t +β3 Xi,t + β4 (XG)it + Z'δi,t + εi,t  (3) 
and  
Ki,t= β0 + β1 Ki,t-l + β2 Ri,t +β3 Gi,t + β4 (XG)it + Z'δi,t + εi,t  (3') 
where K is the flows of foreign investment, R is the (risk-free) cost of capital, G is the 
rate of political risk guarantee on investment, X is the rate of government 
expropriation of foreign investment, GX is an interaction term, Z is a vector of 
additional control variables, and ε an error term. The subscripts i, t and l are country, 
time and lag indicators. The interaction term in equation (3') suggests that political 
risk guarantees might have different effects on the flows of foreign investment for 
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countries with different risk levels of investment expropriation. Alternatively the 
interaction term in equation (3) suggests that political risk might have different effects 
on the flows of foreign investment for countries with different political risk guarantee 
levels. The total effect of G on a flow of foreign investment K a country can attract is 
      , where    is the direct effect of the political risk guarantee and     is the 
indirect effect through X or the interaction between G and X. 
 K could be debt or equity flows of nonresidents relative to GDP.
14
 Unlike 
other studies examining capital flows, we distinguish debt flows into non-guaranteed 
debt (private non-guaranteed debt - PNG) and guaranteed debt (public and publicly 
guaranteed debt - PPG) flows to allow us to examine the influence of political risk 
guarantees. PNG debt is an external obligation of a private debtor, the repayment of 
which is non-guaranteed by a public entity. PNG debt flows are net flows of long term 
nature, calculated as the difference between disbursements and principal repayments. 
Long-term debt has an original or extended maturity of more than one year. PPG debt 
is an external obligation of public sector or of private sector the repayment of which is 
guaranteed by a public entity.
15
  Similar to PNG debt net flows, PPG debt net flows 
are of long-term nature, calculated as the difference between disbursements and 
principal repayments.  
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 This is similar to Campion and Neumann (2004). 
15
 The public sector includes the general government, monetary authorities, and public corporations. A 
public corporation, financial or nonfinancial, is subject to control by government units, where control 
over a corporation is defined as the ability to determine general corporate policy by choosing 
appropriate directors, if necessary. Control can be established through government ownership of more 
than half of the voting shares or more than half of the shareholder voting power (including through 
ownership of a second public corporation that in turn has a majority of the voting shares), or through 
special legislation, decree, or regulation that empowers the government to determine corporate policy 
or to appoint directors. The publicly guaranteed private sector external debt component of PPG is 
defined as the external debt liabilities of the private sector, the servicing of which is contractually 
guaranteed by a public entity resident in the same economy as the debtor. Private sector external debt, 
which is not contractually guaranteed by the public sector is classified as PNG. Chapter 5 of 
International Monetary Fund (2003) provides a detailed definition of the public sector. 
15 
 
K could also be equity flows, which are decomposed into FDI and portfolio 
equity. Portfolio equity, as defined by WDI, includes net inflows from equity 
securities other than those recorded as direct investment and including shares, stocks, 
depository receipts (American or global), and direct purchases of shares in local stock 
markets by foreign investors. FDI is investment in equity capital, retained earnings, 
other long-term capital, and short-term capital, which acquires 10 percent or more of 
the voting stock in an enterprise operating in a foreign economy. FDI net inflows are 
the difference between new investment inflows and disinvestment.  
 R is measured by the 3-month treasury bills rate. We expect an increase in the 
interest rate would increase the cost of capital, reduce profit, and decrease foreign 
investment flows. Campion and Neumann (2004) also control for the U.S. T-bill rate 
as an external (push) factor that globally determines capital flows to emerging 
economies. Accordingly, an increase in interest rates may increase capital flows. Thus 
the effect of an increase in the 3-month treasury-bills rate is ambiguous.  
The rate of political risk guarantee G is proxied by the number of bilateral 
investment treaties ratified with OECD countries relative to the total number of 
OECD countries. The higher the percentage of ratified treaties, the closer is the degree 
of property rights protection to that in OECD countries, and the lower is the political 
risk. While we expect a positive effect of political risk guarantees on capital flows in 
general, the effect might differ with the type of capital flows. For example, political 
risk guarantees might encourage more equity flows at the expense of debt flows. 
The rate of government expropriation of foreign investment, X, is measured by 
the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) investment profile component of the 
political risk index, which reflects the risk of investment expropriation, profits 
repatriation, and payment delays. This indicator ranges from 0 to 12, where 0 
16 
 
indicates the highest risk and 12 the lowest risk. The indicator in this paper is 
expressed as a percentage of the maximum score. Similar to political risk guarantees, 
we expect a positive effect of the investment profile indicator on capital flows in 
general. However, the effect might differ with the type of capital flows. For example, 
an improvement in investment profile might encourage more equity and long-term 
debt flows but discourage the use of government guaranteed debt and thus public and 
publicly guaranteed debt flows. It might also lengthen debt maturity and thus reduce 
short-term debt flows (Mina 2006).  
 The vector of additional control variables, Z, includes variables which have 
been found to be significant in other capital flows studies. Studies have typically 
included economic development, trade openness, financial development, and capital 
control variables, which capture the pull factors in the recipient economy (Binici et al 
2010; Campion and Neumann 2004; Okada 2013). We include real GDP per capita (in 
2005 US$) to account for economic development, the sum of exports and imports as a 
percentage of GDP to account for trade openness, domestic credit provided by the 
banking sector as a percentage of GDP to account for financial development, and the 
Chinn-Ito financial openness index to account for capital controls. 
 The Chinn-Ito financial openness index, which was initially introduced in Chinn 
and Ito (2006), measures the degree of capital account openness. The Chinn-Ito index 
codifies four restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF's 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. The four 
restrictions the index cover are the existence of multiple exchange rates, the presence 
of restrictions on current and capital account transactions, and the regulatory 
requirements of the surrender of export proceeds. The index ranges from zero to 100; 
17 
 
the higher the index value the more open the country is to cross-border capital 
transactions. Chinn and Ito (2008) provide details on the construction of the index. 
 In addition to these explanatory variables, we add two structural breaks to 
reflect the two financial crises of 1997 and 2007.
16
 The first crisis dummy takes a 
value of 1 for the years 1997-1998. The second crisis dummy takes a value of 1 for 
the years 2007-2009. 
Data on debt and equity flows, trade, and banking sector credit domestic are 
obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI). Data on per capita real GDP 
are obtained from the UNCTADSTAT database. Data on the 3-month treasury bills 
rate are obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System website. 
Data on ratified bilateral investment treaties with OECD countries are extracted and 
coded from the UNCTADSTAT database. Data on the risk of investment 
expropriation are obtained from ICRG’s investment profile component of the political 
risk index, as mentioned above. Data on the Chinn-Ito index is available at Chinn-
Ito’s website.17 
A sample of 66 countries over the period 1984-2011 are selected from a list of 
countries classified by the World Bank in July 2012 as middle income countries and 
on which ICRG’s investment profile data are available. Appendix A provides the list 
of countries together with variable means. 
 
4. Empirical issues and estimation methodology 
There are a number of empirical issues that we consider before embarking on 
estimation. The first issue is the likely presence of unit root in the empirical model 
                                              
16
 The 2007-2009 financial crisis is a major motivation for this paper as discussed in the introduction. 
17
 The index is available at http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm. 
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variables, especially in FDI. In presence of non-stationarity, we could end up with 
spurious regressions. Thus we use a battery of panel unit root tests. The first test is the 
Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) common unit root test, which assumes identical first-order 
autoregressive coefficients across countries. The test involves the following 
regression equation:  
                ∑   
 
              (4) 
The subscripts i and t are country and time indicators with i=1,...,N and t=1,...,T. The 
null hypothesis tested is             against the alternative hypothesis       
         . We also use the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) W-stat and the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller - Fisher Chi-squared tests, which allow the first-order 
autoregressive coefficients to vary across countries under the alternative hypothesis 
       .  
 The second likely issue is endogeneity, defined in terms of the correlation 
between the explanatory variables and the error term. Endogeneity may result from 
the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term, 
unobservable country-specific effects, simultaneity or reverse causality from the 
explanatory variables to the dependent variable, and variable omission. Endogeneity 
results in inconsistent ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates.  
 A dynamic panel GMM approach is therefore adopted in estimating the 
empirical model along the line of Arellano and Bond (1991).
18
 Consider the simple 
empirical model below: 
tiitititi vXyy ,,1,,     i = 1,…, N t = 1,…, T (5) 
                                              
18
 For recent applications of GMM estimators see for example Che et al (2012), Sen et al (2007), and 
Rioja and Valev (2004).  
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where yi,t is the dependent variable and Xi,t is the vector of explanatory variables, and 
the subscripts i and t denote country and time periods. The error term comprises 
unobservable country effect, i , in addition to a disturbance term tiv , . The lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the country effect i and thus the error term μi + 
νi,t To eliminate the unobservable country effect, the GMM estimator takes the first 
difference: 
titititi vXyy ,,1,,                              (6) 
Although unobservable country effect is eliminated with differencing, there can still 
be an endogneity bias arising from the correlation between the lagged difference of 
the dependent variable and the error term. In this case instrumental variables are used. 
The difference GMM estimator uses the lagged levels of the explanatory 
variables as instruments on the conditions that the error term of the differenced 
equation is not serially correlated and that the lagged levels of the explanatory 
variables are weakly exogenous. However, when the dependent variable is highly 
persistent over time, as in the case of capital flows, the difference GMM suffers weak 
instrument problem and its asymptotic properties may be affected; both point 
estimates and hypothesis tests become unreliable (Che et al 2013).  
To address these problems, a system GMM along the lines of Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) is adopted instead. For system GMM, 
lagged differences of explanatory variables are used as instruments, assuming the 
absence of serial correlation in the error term, and between these instruments and the 
error term. The moment conditions are thus written as:  
0)]([ ,,   tiilti vyE   for l=1   (7) 
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0)]([ ,,   tiilti vXE   for l=1   (8) 
To ensure that the above moment conditions are satisfied, we test the lack of second-
order serial correlation and use the Hansen/Sargan tests of over-identifying 
restrictions to test for instrument validity.  
 With the growth in time dimension, which is 28 years in our sample, 
instrument proliferation becomes an issue. The Hansen and the difference Hansen J 
tests for orthogonality under difference and system GMM, respectively, might suffer 
from notable size distortion resulting in poor detection of orthogonality conditions 
violation (Che et al 2013). To overcome this problem and to also mitigate finite 
sample bias, Roodman (2009) suggests collapsing the instruments, which we follow.
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Finally, in identifying the exogeneity or endogeneity of the explanatory variables, 
Granger causality tests are conducted and variables are identified accordingly. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Sample countries 
 Appendix A provides information on our sample countries. For the total 
sample, countries seemed to rely more heavily on debt flows compared to equity 
flows. PNG and PPG debt flows amounted for more than 0.6 and 1.5 percent of GDP, 
respectively, compared to 0.15 and 0.16 percent of GDP for FDI and portfolio equity 
flows, respectively. 
A look at individual countries shows that Kazakhstan and Nicaragua had the 
highest average PNG and PPG debt flows amounting to 7.5 and 10.1 percent of GDP, 
respectively, while Nicaragua and Latvia had the highest average long- and short-term 
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 Though it is interesting to compare estimation results under (non-collapsed instruments) system and 
difference GMM, we have decided for paper brevity not to include estimation results in this paper. 
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debt flows of 11.2 and 5.4 percent of GDP. As far as equity flows are concerned, 
Mongolia and Vietnam had the highest FDI and portfolio equity flows of 2.7 and 2 
percent of GDP, respectively. 
As far as political risk and political risk guarantees are concerned, the 
correlation coefficient between ICRG’s investment profile and the total number of 
ratified treaties with OECD countries is 0.46 suggesting that low political risk is 
positively correlated with political risk guarantees. At the country level, the risk of 
investment expropriation was lowest in Lithuania and highest in Venezuela. The total 
number of bilateral investment treaties ratified with OECD countries was highest in 
China, with a total number of 22 treaties.
20
 Brazil and Iraq on other hand ratified no 
treaties with OECD countries though the former signed 11 treaties and the latter 
signed 1 only.
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Libya had the highest real GDP per capita amounting to nearly $7,300. 
Guyana had the highest average trade and banking credit amounting to 188 and 157 
percent of GDP. Panama reached the maximum score possible (2.44) on financial 
openness followed by Latvia (2.31). 
 
5.2 Empirical issues diagnostics and treatment 
Panel unit root test results reject the null hypothesis of the presence of unit root 
process for almost all variables, as shown in table 1. LLC tests results support the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of common unit root for all variables with the 
exception of PNG debt flows, real GDP per capita and the Chinn-Ito financial 
openness index. IPS and ADF-Fisher test results also support the rejection of the null 
                                              
20
 Mean FDI inflows to China amounted to over $60 billion and reached a maximum of nearly $244 
billion in 2010. 
21
 Mean FDI inflows to Brazil amounted to nearly $18 billion and reached a maximum of nearly $72 
billion in 2011. 
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hypothesis of individual unit root for all variables except for real GDP per capita only. 
The second difference of PNG debt flows, the first difference of real GDP per capita 
and the second difference of the financial openness index are stationary under the 
three panel unit tests and are used in the empirical model.  
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
Granger causality test results, based on 5 lags to account for persistent 
relationships, suggest the presence of reverse causality between the dependent 
variable(s) and the explanatory variables, which we account for in GMM estimation. 
The results are reported for 5 lags to account for persistence in capital flows and 
reflect long-term relationship. As table 2 shows, the null hypotheses that the second 
difference of PNG flows do not Granger-cause the first difference of real GDP per 
capita, and banking credit and trade as a percentage of GDP could not be accepted. 
The null hypotheses that PPG flows do not Granger-cause banking credit and trade as 
a percentage of GDP could not be accepted. On the equity side, the null hypothesis 
that FDI flows do not Granger-cause the 3-month treasury bills rates and ICRG’s 
investment profile could not be accepted. Also the null hypothesis that portfolio 
equity flows do not Granger-cause the number of ratified treaties with OECD 
countries and the first difference of real GDP per capita could not be accepted. 
Accordingly these variables are included as endogenous variables in estimation in 
addition to the lagged dependent variable.     
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
We report p values for the Arellano-Bond and Hansen J test statistics. 
Failure to reject both hypotheses indicates consistency of estimates. We also 
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report Windmeijer’s (2005) robust standard errors, which provide consistent 
estimates and correct for finite sample biases found in two-step system GMM.
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5.3 Empirical results 
 Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 report the estimation results for PNG, PPG, portfolio 
equity and FDI flows, respectively. Tables with letter A (B) present the results for 
empirical model 3 (3'). We introduce the explanatory variables gradually to be able to 
examine how the influence of political risk guarantees responds to increasing model 
complexity. 
5.3.1 PNG and PPG debt flows 
Table 3A shows that an improvement in expropriation risk increases PNG debt 
flows. An improvement in risk by one percentage point increases debt flows by 0.06 
percentage point, in specification 2 for example. The negative interaction term 
suggests however that the positive influence of risk improvement diminishes as more 
treaties, and thus higher percentage, with OECD countries are ratified. The total 
influence of expropriation risk improvement is positive for all but one specification, 
and ranges between 0.01 percentage point in specification 3 to about 0.02 percentage 
point in specifications 5-7. Results of table 3A also suggest that the higher the degree 
of economic development, the more PNG debt flows a country can attract. 
Table 3B shows a seemingly opposite influence of political risk guarantees. The 
influence of ratified bilateral investment treaties is negative, possibly due to the 
increase in portfolio equity flows, as discussed further below.  The interaction term 
suggests however that the negative influence improves with expropriation risk 
improvement. This result seems to confirm Mina’s (2012) MENA countries finding 
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 See Okada (2013) for example. 
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that the positive influence of bilateral investment treaties hinges on strong domestic 
institutional functions. Despite the primarily (direct) negative influence of bilateral 
investment treaties, the total influence is positive. An increase in the percentage of 
ratified OECD treaties by 1 percentage point increases PNG debt flows between 60-
65 percentage points. We should note that such high influence may depend partially 
on how we account for or count bilateral investment treaties.  
Table 4A shows that an improvement in expropriation risk decreases PPG debt 
flows, unlike the positive influence on PNG debt flows. The positive and consistently, 
statistically significant interaction term suggests however that such negative influence 
improves as more treaties, and thus higher percentage, with OECD countries are 
ratified. Similar to the influence of expropriation risk, bilateral investment treaties 
also have negative influence. However, the statistical significance of the coefficients 
of bilateral investment treaties and the interaction term is very sensitive to model 
specification. Economic development has inverse relationship with PPG debt flows; 
the more developed the country the less PPG debt flows it attracts. 
5.3.2 Portfolio equity and FDI flows 
 Table 5A shows in specifications 2-9 that an improvement in expropriation 
risk has a surprisingly direct negative influence on portfolio equity flows. It is 
possible that this negative influence results from the increase in other types of capital 
flows, in particular PNG debt flows, in response to risk improvement. The negative 
influence however improves with the increase in ratified bilateral investment treaties, 
a point we turn to. Table 5B shows positive influence of bilateral investment treaties 
on portfolio equity flows, which diminishes with improvement in expropriation risk. 
In both tables a higher level of financial development increases portfolio equity flows. 
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 The results of tables 6B are surprising and do not match the recent evidence of 
statistically significant positive relationship between bilateral investment treaties and 
FDI flows. The results of table 6A are yet more surprising. Apart from their statistical 
insignificance, the coefficient signs are sensitive to model specification. However, 
both tables render intuitive result: Trade openness encourages more FDI inflows. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The results above highlight a number of interesting points. First, less political 
risk and more political risk guarantees do not have the same type of direct influence 
on non-guaranteed debt flows. Non-guaranteed debt flows increase with the 
improvement in political risk but decreases with more political risk guarantees. 
Second, the total (combined) influence of less political risk and of more political risk 
guarantees each on non-guaranteed debt flows is positive, however.  Third, in the case 
of public and publicly guaranteed debt flows, less political risk and more political risk 
guarantees share the same type of influence; both reduce debt flows. Fourth, unlike 
non-guaranteed debt which increases with economic development, public and publicly 
guaranteed debt decreases with economic development. Fifth, political risk guarantees 
have positive influence on portfolio equity flows, which diminishes with political risk 
improvement. Sixth, both financial development and trade openness matter for equity 
flows, with the former encouraging portfolio equity flows and the latter encouraging 
FDI flows. 
This research has several important policy implications. First, political risk 
guarantees, which bilateral investment treaties provide, can help increase increasing 
financial integration in world capital markets. Second, from a regulatory view point 
countries pondering regulating the financial system should consider the impact of 
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political risk guarantees in designing and implementing a regulatory framework. In 
addition, countries should also consider the impact of these guarantees on the capital 
account when contemplating capital account liberalization or restrictions.  
This paper brings to the forefront two important research questions. First, do 
political risk guarantees affect country credit rating and risk premia? Second, do these 
guarantees affect financial institutions investments decisions? We leave these 
questions open for future research. 
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Figure 1: Equity and Debt Flows to 
Middle Income Countries 
FDI+Portfolio Equity FDI Debt Portfolio Equity
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Table 1 
Panel Unit Root Tests 
Variable Form LLC IPS 
ADF-
Fisher 
Dependent Variable 
   
PNG 0.015 0.000 0.000 
PPG 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Long -term Debt 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Short-term Debt 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FDI 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Portfolio Equity 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Explanatory Variables 
   
Treasury Bills (3 months) 0.007 0.000 0.002 
Annual OECD Treaties Ratified (Ratio)  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Investment Profile Ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Real GDP per Capita 
   
   Level 0.567 0.996 0.210 
   First Difference 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Banking Credit 0.023 0.257 0.029 
Trade 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Financial Openness Index 
   
   Level 0.976 0.002 0.003 
   First Difference 1.000 0.000 0.000 
   Second Difference 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: LLC tests for common unit root, while IPS and ADF-Fisher test for 
individual unit roots. Panel unit root tests include individual intercept and trend. p 
values are reported for test statistics. 
 
  
35 
 
Table 2 
Granger Causality Test Statistics 
 R G X Development Finance Openness KA 
PNG        
H0: A NOT→B 0.000 0.959 0.571 0.000 0.036 0.004 0.338 
H0: B NOT→A 0.000 0.957 0.146 0.000 0.687 0.095 0.545 
        
PPG        
H0: A NOT→B 0.084 0.803 0.081 0.655 0.000 0.008 0.372 
H0: B NOT→A 0.557 0.843 0.833 0.353 0.000 0.002 0.208 
        
Long -term 
Debt 
       
H0: A NOT→B 0.141 0.757 0.030 0.044 0.000 0.513 0.894 
H0: B NOT→A 0.052 0.864 0.261 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.623 
        
Short-term 
Debt 
       
H0: A NOT→B 0.014 0.634 0.453 0.124 0.000 0.000 0.184 
H0: B NOT→A 0.051 0.034 0.070 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.009 
        
FDI        
H0: A NOT→B 0.007 0.967 0.004 0.183 0.119 0.198 0.587 
H0: B NOT→A 0.075 0.938 0.961 0.181 0.017 0.000 0.338 
        
Portfolio 
Equity 
       
H0: A NOT→B 0.099 0.023 0.406 0.001 0.063 0.349 0.098 
H0: B NOT→A 0.010 0.021 0.896 0.895 0.002 0.366 0.071 
Notes: H0: A NOT→B is the null hypothesis that the dependent variable does not Granger-cause the 
explanatory variable, while H0: B NOT→A is the null hypothesis that the explanatory variable does not 
Granger-cause the dependent variable. p values are reported for test statistics using 5 lags. The first 
difference of real GDP per capita and the second difference of financial openness are used.
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Table 3A: Political Risk and PNG Debt Flows 
  (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
L.K 0.477a 0.445a 0.485a 0.263 0.266 0.272 0.306c 0.310c 0.309c 
 (0.176) (0.159) (0.160) (0.190) (0.190) (0.174) (0.181) (0.178) (0.184) 
X 0.011b 0.060a 0.031a 0.027a 0.032a 0.035a 0.032a 0.031a 0.026b 
 (0.005) (0.021) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
GX  -2.491b -0.681a -0.579b -0.561b -0.557b -0.537b -0.514b -0.457b 
  (0.970) (0.222) (0.261) (0.256) (0.273) (0.233) (0.249) (0.204) 
R   0.065 0.078c 0.085b 0.097b 0.093b 0.090b 0.059 
   (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.048) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038) 
Development (D1)    0.003b 0.003a 0.003a 0.003a 0.003a 0.003a 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Openness     -0.007 -0.012 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 
     (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Finance      0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 
      (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
KA (D2)       -0.063 -0.106 -0.049 
       (0.100) (0.101) (0.120) 
Crisis1        -0.003 0.087 
        (0.214) (0.187) 
Crisis2         0.353c 
         (0.211) 
Constant -0.414c -1.358b -1.216b -1.186a -0.991c -0.920 -0.934 -0.848 -0.571 
 (0.219) (0.652) (0.538) (0.393) (0.602) (0.640) (0.609) (0.672) (0.597) 
          
Observations 1,509 1,509 1,509 1,430 1,418 1,392 1,320 1,320 1,320 
Countries 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 
Instruments 31 31 58 82 109 136 136 137 138 
Wald test 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 
A-B 0.947 0.505 0.838 0.293 0.296 0.290 0.270 0.267 0.281 
Hansen J statistic 0.122 0.762 0.412 0.948 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Expropriation risk effect 0.011 -0.089 0.010 0.011 0.014 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.014 
Notes: Windmeijer’s robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. p 
values are reported for diagnostic tests. A-B reports the Arellano-Bond (AR2) test for autocorrelation. Hansen J statistic reports the test 
statistic of the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, except 
for FDI where it is net inflows as a percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI, and PE are private non-guaranteed debt, public and publicly 
guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. X is the risk of investment appropriation. G is political risk 
guarantees. GX is interaction term. R is risk free interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first difference). 
Openness is trade openness. Finance is the degree of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in second difference). 
Crisis1 is 1997-1998 financial crisis dummy. Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy. Two-step system GMM is used in estimation with 
instruments collapsed. Risk improvement effect is the estimated effect of expropriation risk on the dependent variable calculated as ß3+ß4X, 
where the sample mean (1.12) of G is used. 
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Table 3B: Political Risk Guarantees and PNG Debt Flows 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
L.K 0.496a 0.489a 0.520a 0.290 0.305 0.311c 0.333c 0.337c 0.309c 
 (0.181) (0.175) (0.158) (0.184) (0.190) (0.187) (0.178) (0.176) (0.185) 
G 0.002 -1.315 -0.322 -0.699b -0.640 -0.743b -0.736b -0.731b -0.710c 
 (0.016) (1.830) (0.576) (0.356) (0.414) (0.320) (0.360) (0.355) (0.378) 
GX  2.176 0.513 1.105c 1.010 1.158b 1.119b 1.107b 1.081c 
  (3.052) (0.970) (0.567) (0.667) (0.506) (0.554) (0.552) (0.581) 
R   -0.013 0.027 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.028 
   (0.040) (0.048) (0.050) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.041) 
Development (D1)    0.003a 0.004a 0.004a 0.004a 0.004a 0.004a 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Openness     -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 
     (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Finance      0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 
      (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
KA (D2)       -0.092 -0.105 -0.060 
       (0.075) (0.090) (0.102) 
Crisis1        -0.074 0.010 
        (0.152) (0.163) 
Crisis2         0.401 
         (0.257) 
Constant 0.214a 0.235a 0.382a 0.142 0.335 0.307 0.278 0.348 0.176 
 (0.081) (0.090) (0.148) (0.317) (0.704) (0.461) (0.576) (0.543) (0.477) 
          
Observations 1,552 1,509 1,509 1,430 1,418 1,392 1,320 1,320 1,320 
Countries 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 
Instruments 31 31 58 82 109 136 136 137 138 
Wald test 0.002 0.037 0.002 0.037 0.047 0.051 0.093 0.121 0.003 
A-B 0.994 0.995 0.933 0.383 0.372 0.365 0.333 0.327 0.360 
Hansen J statistic 0.106 0.087 0.271 0.908 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Guarantees effect - - - 61.7 - 64.7 62.5 61.8 60.4 
Notes: Windmeijer’s robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. p 
values are reported for diagnostic tests. A-B reports the Arellano-Bond (AR2) test for autocorrelation. Hansen J statistic reports the test 
statistic of the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, 
except for FDI where it is net inflows as a percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI and PE are private non-guaranteed debt, public and 
publicly guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. G is political risk guarantees. GX is interaction 
term. R is risk free interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first difference). Openness is trade openness. 
Finance is the degree of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in second difference). Crisis1 is 1997-1998 
financial crisis dummy. Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy. Two-step system GMM is used in estimation with instruments 
collapsed. Guarantees effect is the estimated effect of political risk guarantees on the dependent variable calculated as ß3+ß4X, where the 
sample mean (56.5) of X is used. 
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Table 4A: Political Risk and PPG Debt Flows 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
L.K 0.209a 0.213a 0.209a 0.211a 0.220a 0.181a 0.172a 0.166b 0.169a 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.046) (0.056) (0.060) (0.074) (0.064) 
X -0.011 -0.036a -0.027b -0.054a -0.018 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.029 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) 
GX  1.293a 0.886a 2.437a 0.944c 1.082b 1.316b 1.418b 1.424b 
  (0.293) (0.335) (0.529) (0.560) (0.545) (0.574) (0.568) (0.627) 
R   0.041 -0.008 0.085 0.063 0.032 0.070 0.090 
   (0.045) (0.060) (0.063) (0.075) (0.079) (0.071) (0.070) 
Development (D1)    -0.002c -0.002b -0.002b -0.002c -0.002 -0.002 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Openness     -0.014 -0.020 -0.023 -0.017 -0.020 
     (0.013) (0.017) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) 
Finance      0.041b 0.028 0.032 0.030 
      (0.021) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) 
KA (D2)       0.199 0.555 0.440 
       (0.220) (0.470) (0.326) 
Crisis1        -1.268 -1.143 
        (0.898) (0.745) 
Crisis2         0.520 
         (0.341) 
Constant 1.500b 2.112a 1.719b 2.358a 2.112b 1.107 1.958 1.276 1.459 
 (0.754) (0.656) (0.716) (0.732) (0.954) (1.410) (2.187) (1.990) (2.215) 
          
Observations 1,509 1,509 1,509 1,430 1,418 1,392 1,320 1,320 1,320 
Countries 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 
Instruments 31 31 32 32 59 86 87 88 89 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 
A-B 0.478 0.45 0.439 0.478 0.398 0.323 0.327 0.349 0.33 
Hansen J statistic 0.053 0.182 0.187 0.606 0.333 0.938 0.966 0.985 0.981 
Expropriation risk effect - 1.4 1.0 2.7 - 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.6 
Notes: Windmeijer’s robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. p 
values are reported for diagnostic tests. A-B reports the Arellano-Bond (AR2) test for autocorrelation. Hansen J statistic reports the test 
statistic of the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, 
except for FDI where it is net inflows as a percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI, and PE are private non-guaranteed debt, public and 
publicly guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. X is the risk of investment appropriation. G is 
political risk guarantees. GX is interaction term. R is risk free interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first 
difference). Openness is trade openness. Finance is the degree of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in 
second difference). Crisis1 is 1997-1998 financial crisis dummy. Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy. Two-step system GMM is 
used in estimation with instruments collapsed. Risk improvement effect is the estimated effect of expropriation risk on the dependent 
variable calculated as ß3+ß4X, where the sample mean (1.12) of G is used. 
39 
 
Table 4B: Political Risk Guarantees and PPG Debt Flows 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
L.K 0.237a 0.198a 0.219a 0.239a 0.214a 0.184a 0.175a 0.184a 0.184a 
 (0.051) (0.048) (0.042) (0.073) (0.049) (0.064) (0.062) (0.056) (0.057) 
G 0.009 2.137c -2.507 -10.789a -1.970c -1.035 -0.723 -0.950 -0.992 
 (0.040) (1.158) (1.974) (3.870) (1.062) (0.706) (0.822) (0.883) (0.921) 
GX  -3.568c 4.182 17.724a 3.229c 1.652 1.135 1.493 1.574 
  (1.919) (3.318) (6.259) (1.749) (1.159) (1.347) (1.427) (1.528) 
R   0.191b 0.461b 0.212b 0.170 0.163 0.175c 0.172c 
   (0.088) (0.196) (0.105) (0.106) (0.101) (0.101) (0.093) 
Development (D1)    -0.003 -0.002b -0.002b -0.002b -0.002b -0.002b 
    (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Openness     -0.013 -0.013 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 
     (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) 
Finance      0.036b 0.026 0.024 0.023 
      (0.018) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
KA (D2)       0.233 0.162 0.151 
       (0.191) (0.250) (0.244) 
Crisis1        -0.674 -0.683 
        (0.533) (0.557) 
Crisis2         0.003 
         (0.238) 
Constant 0.853a 0.960a 0.201 -0.801 1.284 -0.346 -0.332 -0.296 -0.103 
 (0.173) (0.177) (0.347) (0.725) (1.082) (1.850) (2.960) (2.959) (2.699) 
          
Observations 1,552 1,509 1,509 1,430 1,418 1,392 1,320 1,320 1,320 
Countries 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 
Instruments 31 31 32 32 59 86 87 88 89 
Wald test 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A-B 0.540 0.521 0.454 0.639 0.396 0.340 0.346 0.350 0.351 
Hansen J statistic 0.071 0.118 0.147 0.116 0.288 0.972 0.975 0.972 0.974 
Guarantees effect - -199.5 - 990.7 180.5 - - - - 
Notes: Windmeijer’s robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. p 
values are reported for diagnostic tests. A-B reports the Arellano-Bond (AR2) test for autocorrelation. Hansen J statistic reports the test 
statistic of the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, 
except for FDI where it is net inflows as a percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI and PE are private non-guaranteed debt, public and 
publicly guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. G is political risk guarantees. GX is interaction 
term. R is risk free interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first difference). Openness is trade openness. 
Finance is the degree of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in second difference). Crisis1 is 1997-1998 
financial crisis dummy. Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy. Two-step system GMM is used in estimation with instruments 
collapsed. Guarantees effect is the estimated effect of political risk guarantees on the dependent variable calculated as ß3+ß4X, where the 
sample mean (56.5) of X is used. 
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Table 5A: Political Risk and Portfolio Equity Flows 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
L.K 0.022 -0.120c -0.111 0.018 0.020 0.004 -0.010 -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.087) (0.072) (0.077) (0.073) (0.072) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.066) 
X 0.004b -0.018b -0.023b -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008c -0.008c -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
GX  1.204a 1.232a 0.445a 0.430a 0.430a 0.447a 0.458a 0.391a 
  (0.369) (0.401) (0.152) (0.154) (0.158) (0.158) (0.164) (0.138) 
R   -0.064c -0.020 -0.019 -0.025c -0.022 -0.021 -0.016 
   (0.034) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Development (D1)    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000c 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Openness     0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Finance      0.005a 0.005a 0.005a 0.005a 
      (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
KA (D2)       0.020 0.021 0.017 
       (0.036) (0.037) (0.034) 
Crisis1        -0.064 -0.042 
        (0.075) (0.072) 
Crisis2         0.042 
         (0.093) 
Constant -0.123 0.374 0.885c 0.272 0.239 0.151 0.138 0.144 0.087 
 (0.081) (0.284) (0.507) (0.175) (0.178) (0.215) (0.242) (0.242) (0.224) 
          
Observations 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,304 1,296 1,261 1,189 1,189 1,189 
Countries 66 66 66 66 65 65 64 64 64 
Instruments 31 31 32 57 58 59 60 61 62 
Wald test 0.042 0.008 0.017 0.021 0.053 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.025 
A-B 0.221 0.770 0.778 0.969 0.979 0.994 0.994 0.985 0.927 
Hansen J statistic 0.081 0.399 0.407 0.378 0.357 0.474 0.522 0.547 0.453 
Expropriation risk effect 0.004 1.34 1.37 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.44 
Notes: Windmeijer’s robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. p 
values are reported for diagnostic tests. A-B reports the Arellano-Bond (AR2) test for autocorrelation. Hansen J statistic reports the test 
statistic of the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, except 
for FDI where it is net inflows as a percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI, and PE are private non-guaranteed debt, public and publicly 
guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. X is the risk of investment appropriation. G is political risk 
guarantees. GX is interaction term. R is risk free interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first difference). 
Openness is trade openness. Finance is the degree of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in second 
difference). Crisis1 is 1997-1998 financial crisis dummy. Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy. Two-step system GMM is used in 
estimation with instruments collapsed. Risk improvement effect is the estimated effect of expropriation risk on the dependent variable 
calculated as ß3+ß4X, where the sample mean (1.12) of G is used. 
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Table 5B: Political Risk Guarantees and Portfolio Equity Flows 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
L.K 0.045 0.083 0.082 0.063 0.059 0.058 0.062 
 (0.091) (0.094) (0.093) (0.087) (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) 
G 0.704c 0.317b 0.289c 0.307c 0.573b 0.569b 0.589b 
 (0.386) (0.152) (0.155) (0.170) (0.237) (0.225) (0.237) 
GX -1.111c -0.469c -0.422 -0.447 -0.851b -0.843b -0.877b 
 (0.635) (0.257) (0.263) (0.284) (0.369) (0.352) (0.373) 
R -0.037c -0.025c -0.022 -0.022c -0.025c -0.027b -0.030c 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) 
Development (D1)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Openness   0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Finance    0.005a 0.005a 0.005a 0.005a 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
KA (D2)     -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
     (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Crisis1      0.112 0.117 
      (0.114) (0.142) 
Crisis2       -0.047 
       (0.084) 
Constant 0.284b 0.226b 0.180 -0.002 -0.047 -0.041 -0.039 
 (0.113) (0.088) (0.116) (0.114) (0.135) (0.129) (0.135) 
        
Observations 1,375 1,304 1,296 1,261 1,189 1,189 1,189 
Countries 66 66 65 65 64 64 64 
Instruments 59 83 84 85 86 87 88 
Wald test 0.238 0.081 0.101 0.007 0.029 0.03 0.046 
A-B 0.179 0.521 0.542 0.489 0.427 0.438 0.491 
Hansen J statistic 0.263 0.923 0.927 0.973 0.982 0.989 0.959 
Guarantees effect -62.1 -26.2 0.3 0.3 -47.5 -47.1 -49.0 
Notes: Windmeijer’s robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% 
level, respectively. p values are reported for diagnostic tests. A-B reports the Arellano-Bond (AR2) test for 
autocorrelation. Hansen J statistic reports the test statistic of the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are 
exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, except for FDI where it is net inflows as a 
percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI and PE are private non-guaranteed debt, public and publicly guaranteed debt, 
foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. G is political risk guarantees. GX is interaction term. 
R is risk free interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first difference). Openness is 
trade openness. Finance is the degree of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in 
second difference). Crisis1 is 1997-1998 financial crisis dummy. Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy. 
Two-step system GMM is used in estimation with instruments collapsed. Guarantees effect is the estimated effect 
of political risk guarantees on the dependent variable calculated as ß3+ß4X, where the sample mean (56.5) of X is 
used. 
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Table 6A: Political Risk and FDI Flows 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
L.K 0.366a 0.330a 0.326a 0.318a 0.321a 0.341a 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) 
X 0.005 -0.023 -0.018 -0.020 -0.028 0.015 
 (0.017) (0.028) (0.030) (0.032) (0.039) (0.021) 
GX 0.197 0.328 0.026 -0.259 -0.444 -0.350 
 (0.265) (0.290) (0.274) (0.253) (0.309) (0.345) 
R -0.093 -0.048 -0.017 0.010 -0.031 -0.082 
 (0.067) (0.058) (0.062) (0.064) (0.073) (0.093) 
Development (D1) 0.003a 0.003a 0.003a 0.003b 0.003b 0.002b 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Openness  0.035a 0.035b 0.038a 0.039a 0.032b 
  (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) 
Finance   -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 
   (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
KA (D2)    0.004 -0.065 -0.117 
    (0.178) (0.216) (0.185) 
Crisis1     1.448 1.326 
     (1.194) (1.246) 
Crisis2      0.655c 
      (0.337) 
Constant 1.650 0.602 0.764 0.829 1.352 -0.670 
 (1.246) (1.177) (1.341) (1.546) (2.063) (1.225) 
       
Observations 1,501 1,467 1,443 1,363 1,363 1,363 
Countries 66 65 65 65 65 65 
Instruments 83 84 85 85 86 87 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A-B 0.277 0.277 0.286 0.300 0.306 0.300 
Hansen J statistic 0.905 0.886 0.895 0.918 0.939 0.958 
Expropriation risk effect - - - - - - 
Notes: Windmeijer’s robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 
5%, 10% level, respectively. p values are reported for diagnostic tests. A-B reports the Arellano-Bond 
(AR2) test for autocorrelation. Hansen J statistic reports the test statistic of the null hypothesis that 
instruments as a group are exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, except 
for FDI where it is net inflows as a percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI, and PE are private non-guaranteed 
debt, public and publicly guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. X is 
the risk of investment appropriation. G is political risk guarantees. GX is interaction term. R is risk free 
interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first difference). Openness is trade 
openness. Finance is the degree of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in 
second difference). Crisis1 is 1997-1998 financial crisis dummy. Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis 
dummy. Two-step system GMM is used in estimation with instruments collapsed. Risk improvement effect 
is the estimated effect of expropriation risk on the dependent variable calculated as ß3+ß4X, where the 
sample mean (1.12) of G is used. 
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Table 6B: Political Risk Guarantees and FDI Flows 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
L.K 0.361a 0.373a 0.386a 0.344a 0.312a 0.310a 0.306a 0.311a 0.330a 
 (0.056) (0.083) (0.049) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
G 0.028 19.703 0.184 1.286 1.667 1.415 1.525 1.942 0.560 
 (0.037) (13.513) (0.625) (1.257) (1.262) (1.114) (1.185) (1.694) (1.256) 
GX  -32.676 -0.246 -2.062 -2.668 -2.270 -2.364 -3.050 -0.853 
  (22.453) (1.034) (2.108) (2.102) (1.865) (1.925) (2.694) (2.045) 
R   -0.068 -0.074 0.012 0.031 0.046 -0.001 -0.123 
   (0.068) (0.058) (0.064) (0.071) (0.081) (0.070) (0.080) 
Development (D1)    0.004a 0.003a 0.003a 0.003b 0.003b 0.002b 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Openness     0.035a 0.036a 0.038a 0.037a 0.032a 
     (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) 
Finance      -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
      (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) 
KA (D2)       -0.045 -0.057 -0.045 
       (0.130) (0.127) (0.119) 
Crisis1        1.229 1.362 
        (1.008) (1.094) 
Crisis2         0.805a 
         (0.273) 
Constant 1.674a 1.703a 2.085a 2.008a -0.716 -0.624 -0.783 -0.693 0.058 
 (0.278) (0.465) (0.289) (0.337) (0.767) (0.772) (0.857) (0.799) (0.628) 
          
Observations 1,629 1,583 1,583 1,501 1,467 1,443 1,363 1,363 1,363 
Countries 66 66 66 66 65 65 65 65 65 
Instruments 31 31 58 57 58 59 59 60 61 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
A-B 0.273 0.508 0.274 0.268 0.270 0.274 0.280 0.225 0.285 
Hansen J statistic 0.041 0.589 0.180 0.181 0.245 0.234 0.211 0.708 0.286 
Guarantees effect - - - - - - - - - 
Notes: Windmeijer’s robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. p 
values are reported for diagnostic tests. A-B reports the Arellano-Bond (AR2) test for autocorrelation. Hansen J statistic reports the test 
statistic of the null hypothesis that instruments as a group are exogenous. Dependent variable K is net flows as a percentage of GDP, except 
for FDI where it is net inflows as a percentage of GDP. PNG, PPG, FDI and PE are private non-guaranteed debt, public and publicly 
guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, respectively. G is political risk guarantees. GX is interaction term. R is risk 
free interest rate. Development is the degree of economic development (in first difference). Openness is trade openness. Finance is the degree 
of financial development. KA is the Chinn-Ito capital control index (in second difference). Crisis1 is 1997-1998 financial crisis dummy. 
Crisis2 is 2007-2009 financial crisis dummy. Two-step system GMM is used in estimation with instruments collapsed. Guarantees effect is 
the estimated effect of political risk guarantees on the dependent variable calculated as ß3+ß4X, where the sample mean (56.5) of X is used. 
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Appendix A 
Dependent and Explanatory Variable Means 
 PNG PPG FDI PE LT ST X G Development Openness Finance KA 
Albania 0.57 2.97 0.41 0.01 3.55 1.26 0.52 15 2004.03 58.18 53.63 -0.36 
Algeria 0.03 -0.69 0.04 0.00 -0.66 -0.08 0.58 12 2823.40 53.86 42.34 -1.27 
Angola 0.00 -1.53 -0.27 0.00 -1.53 0.41 0.50 2 1669.28 113.66 10.34 -1.46 
Argentina 0.18 0.93 0.06 0.07 1.12 -0.21 0.48 19 4405.72 26.68 35.82 -0.17 
Armenia 1.31 3.67 0.33 0.02 4.98 0.90 0.63 12 1193.49 77.85 17.12 2.20 
Azerbaijan 0.43 1.82 -0.23 0.00 2.25 0.30 0.74 11 1397.14 91.02 19.79 -0.79 
Belarus 0.37 1.16 0.38 0.01 1.53 2.02 0.48 12 2584.68 125.11 25.69 -1.32 
Bolivia 0.39 2.72 0.13 0.00 3.10 0.14 0.51 12 961.09 54.82 44.25 0.62 
Botswana 0.00 0.85 -0.06 0.05 0.85 0.11 0.77 2 4015.58 93.04 -30.92 0.63 
Brazil 0.56 0.32 0.08 0.52 0.87 0.13 0.53 0 4436.82 20.61 91.05 -1.05 
Bulgaria 2.50 0.84 0.23 0.09 3.34 1.65 0.69 18 3145.29 104.00 59.71 0.18 
Cameroon -0.31 1.06 0.04 -0.01 0.75 0.02 0.57 4 958.77 47.36 18.12 -0.94 
Chile 2.03 0.86 0.24 0.53 2.89 0.64 0.72 17 5598.12 62.17 77.88 -0.23 
China 0.05 0.85 0.09 0.25 0.90 0.64 0.56 22 1144.23 43.45 108.97 -1.32 
Colombia 0.43 1.04 0.09 0.10 1.47 0.08 0.57 2 3138.43 34.11 43.12 -1.05 
Costa Rica 0.36 0.28 0.15 0.00 0.63 0.35 0.62 8 3942.51 81.09 33.80 0.11 
Cote d'Ivoire -0.42 0.71 0.04 0.02 0.28 0.82 0.49 1 970.90 74.35 30.42 -0.94 
Dominican Rep. 0.01 1.15 0.13 0.00 1.15 0.25 0.60 4 3011.21 72.09 32.89 -0.56 
Ecuador 0.51 1.02 0.02 0.01 1.52 0.00 0.42 9 2453.75 59.59 25.45 0.26 
Egypt -0.04 0.95 -0.10 0.02 0.92 -0.15 0.53 18 1074.13 51.27 89.53 0.36 
El Salvador 0.24 1.89 0.03 0.00 2.13 0.44 0.53 10 2349.02 59.98 45.52 0.66 
Ghana 0.00 4.09 0.30 0.10 4.10 0.59 0.58 5 685.29 67.40 25.19 -1.37 
Guatemala 0.24 0.48 0.07 0.00 0.71 0.36 0.61 9 1972.01 50.10 31.40 0.97 
Guyana -0.02 6.21 0.20 0.00 6.19 1.83 0.52 2 1566.40 187.55 157.36 0.74 
Honduras 0.39 3.10 0.20 0.00 3.49 0.19 0.54 8 1275.10 95.95 39.46 -0.54 
India 0.35 0.66 0.06 0.56 1.02 0.22 0.58 20 556.37 27.22 53.50 -1.17 
Indonesia 0.24 0.72 0.07 -0.02 0.96 0.33 0.56 11 1355.74 54.81 43.11 1.71 
Iran 0.00 -0.52 0.01 0.00 -0.52 0.76 0.45 10 2430.92 38.29 46.91 -1.00 
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Iraq na na 0.00 0.04 na na 0.42 0 615.75 na -7.35 -0.63 
Jamaica 1.23 2.27 0.03 0.00 3.50 0.21 0.63 8 3930.32 98.82 50.44 0.83 
Jordan 0.09 2.73 0.13 0.09 2.82 3.11 0.63 15 2081.43 122.59 93.56 0.87 
Kazakhstan 7.49 0.80 0.35 0.36 8.30 1.19 0.70 11 3042.99 88.76 25.63 -1.17 
Latvia 3.75 2.03 0.25 0.09 5.79 5.35 0.83 21 5290.13 101.79 47.62 2.31 
Lebanon 0.18 4.41 0.19 1.91 4.59 1.65 0.50 15 5072.82 71.16 138.37 1.79 
Libya na na 0.09 0.00 na na 0.58 8 7282.21 68.45 39.56 -1.22 
Lithuania 1.81 2.60 0.17 0.12 4.41 1.64 0.83 20 6147.94 111.53 32.22 2.26 
Malaysia 0.90 -0.06 0.07 0.01 0.84 0.70 0.65 10 4193.53 170.33 125.85 0.91 
Mexico 0.34 0.82 0.03 0.37 1.16 0.22 0.69 19 7163.76 49.23 41.28 0.39 
Moldova 2.03 1.93 0.18 0.12 3.96 3.29 0.52 15 697.05 116.26 33.66 -1.12 
Mongolia 0.20 3.58 2.67 0.57 3.78 0.16 0.53 16 871.18 107.14 21.81 1.02 
Morocco 0.22 1.14 0.08 0.09 1.36 0.10 0.62 14 1688.30 62.02 67.51 -1.11 
Namibia na na 0.29 0.40 na na 0.70 7 3148.03 105.12 46.10 -1.21 
Nicaragua 1.11 10.08 0.38 0.00 11.19 -0.12 0.48 9 828.22 64.55 84.61 0.76 
Nigeria -0.01 -0.76 0.11 0.23 -0.76 1.08 0.46 10 620.05 68.78 25.17 -1.04 
Pakistan 0.09 1.35 0.02 0.25 1.45 0.17 0.46 12 591.00 34.59 49.00 -1.19 
Panama 0.63 0.82 0.54 0.00 1.45 -0.18 0.61 13 4162.54 153.64 76.82 2.44 
Papua New 
Guinea 
4.14 0.16 -0.26 0.00 4.30 0.11 0.54 3 810.12 109.10 29.25 -0.27 
Paraguay 0.32 0.63 0.06 0.00 0.95 0.52 0.64 12 1308.81 88.90 25.25 0.15 
Peru 0.62 0.69 0.19 0.12 1.31 0.24 0.55 18 2621.72 36.22 19.32 1.15 
Philippines 0.26 1.33 0.03 0.33 1.59 0.08 0.58 16 1079.03 78.00 45.19 -0.30 
Russia 0.75 0.60 0.14 0.15 1.35 0.45 0.57 20 4587.56 55.90 29.17 -0.32 
Senegal 0.07 2.72 0.03 -0.01 2.79 -0.05 0.59 4 728.85 63.85 28.18 -0.72 
South Africa 0.08 0.62 0.04 1.36 0.70 0.26 0.68 15 4801.41 51.87 145.01 -1.28 
Sri Lanka 0.14 2.90 0.04 -0.45 3.04 0.24 0.57 14 971.61 70.64 40.34 -0.14 
Sudan 0.00 0.99 0.11 -0.01 0.99 0.03 0.41 1 724.97 25.70 15.92 -1.09 
Suriname na na 0.43 0.00 na na 0.45 1 3292.85 65.63 56.13 -1.52 
Syria 0.00 2.17 0.10 0.00 2.17 0.19 0.44 7 1366.52 62.53 50.33 -1.86 
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Thailand 0.10 0.16 0.05 0.85 0.26 0.66 0.60 9 2066.76 101.38 122.39 -0.26 
Tunisia 0.26 1.55 -0.02 0.14 1.80 0.78 0.61 14 2607.93 87.89 67.52 -1.02 
Turkey 1.23 0.88 0.07 0.20 2.12 0.76 0.56 18 5794.68 42.53 38.59 -0.73 
Ukraine 2.76 0.50 0.22 0.27 3.26 2.08 0.51 20 1619.83 90.25 41.98 -1.34 
Uruguay -0.04 1.77 0.17 0.00 1.74 0.18 0.68 16 4868.27 45.77 46.32 1.77 
Venezuela -0.24 0.74 0.06 0.22 0.49 0.08 0.39 12 5532.70 50.17 28.85 -0.31 
Vietnam 0.04 1.39 0.23 1.97 1.43 0.58 0.54 18 446.46 103.18 57.92 -1.19 
Yemen 0.00 1.18 0.01 0.00 1.18 -0.53 0.58 10 762.22 66.69 23.31 2.08 
Zambia 0.60 3.02 0.36 0.07 3.62 0.57 0.51 1 650.21 72.02 46.42 0.60 
             
Total sample 0.61 1.53 0.15 0.16 2.14 0.59 0.57 22.00 2534.89 74.25 50.40 -0.16 
No. of Countries 62 62 66 66 62 62 66 66 66 65 66 66 
Max Kazakhstan Nicaragua Mongolia Vietnam Nicaragua Latvia Lithuania China Libya Guyana Guyana Panama 
Min Cote 
d'Ivoire 
Angola Angola Sri 
Lanka 
Angola Yemen Venezuela Brazil, 
Iraq 
Vietnam Brazil Botswana Syria 
 
Notes: PNG, PPG, FDI, PE, LT, and ST are flows of private non-guaranteed debt, public and publicly guaranteed debt, foreign direct investment, and portfolio equity, long-
term debt, short-term debt, respectively, as a percentage of GDP. X is the ratio of ICRG’s investment profile to the maximum score of 12. G is the total number of treaties 
ratified with OECD countries. Development is Real GDP per capita is in US$. Openness is the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. Finance is domestic 
credit provided by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP. KA is the Chinn-Ito’s financial openness index. The maximum score of Chinn-Ito financial openness index is 
2.439. “na” indicates non-availability of data. 
 
 
 
 
